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Treasury Regulation of International Wire
Transfer and Money Laundering: A Case
for a Permanent Moratorium
I. INTRODUCTION
The basis of virtually every international business transaction is a
transfer of assets in the form of currency, instruments or other goods or
services as consideration for that transaction. Modern technology has
contributed greatly to the speed and efficiency of funds transfers con-
nected with these transactions.
Electronic funds transfers are "a series of messages to and through
one or more banks that are intended to result in the payment of funds
from one person to another."' This is accomplished through the electronic
debiting of the account of the "originator" or person sending the money
and a corresponding credit to the "beneficiary" or the person receiving
the funds.2 No cash is physically transported in this type of transaction.
The speed and efficiency of this system has helped facilitate the expan-
sion of international trade by making the payment process less cumber-
some and, in fact, almost instantaneous.
This ease and facility has unfortunately also provided an efficient
system by which to "launder" illicit cash proceeds from criminal activity
such as narcotics trafficking.3 Laundering such illegal proceeds into usa-
ble, apparently legitimate assets is essential for many criminal enter-
prises. Estimates of the amount of money illegally laundered for all pur-
poses range from $100 billion to $300 billion annually." Once absorbed
into the system, this "dirty money" becomes increasingly difficult to dis-
1. Proposed Amendment to the Bank Secrecy Act Regulations, 55 Fed. Reg. 41,696
(1990), to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 103 (proposed Oct. 15, 1990). "Electronic funds trans-
fers" is a term used in statutes and regulations domestically and will be used interchangea-
bly with the terms "wire transfer," "electronic payments," and "electronic transfer"
throughout this article.
2. Id.
3. "Nowhere ... is the need for money laundering more important than in the illicit
drug trade - a cash business with estimated U.S. sales in excess of $100 billion annually."
U.S. GEN. ACCT'G OFC., REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NARCOTICS
AND INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, U.S. SENATE, MONEY
LAUNDERING: THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IS RESPONDING TO THE PROBLEM, GAO/NSIAD-91-130,
at 2 (May 1991) [hereinafter 1991 GAO Report].
4. U.S. GEN. ACCT'G OFC., REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN AND RANKING MINORITY MEMBER,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TREASURY, POSTAL SERVICE AND GENERAL GOVERNMENT, COMMITTEE ON
APPROPRIATIONS, U.S. SENATE, MONEY LAUNDERING: TREASURY'S FINANCIAL CRIMES ENFORCE-
MENT NETWORK, GAO/GGD-91-53, at 2 (Mar. 1991).
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tinguish from legitimate funds.5 Commingling encourages criminal activ-
ity by allowing perpetrators to benefit from their illegally derived cash
proceeds. Thus, money laundering has been described as a "dirty needle"
injecting and infecting legitimate markets with the disease of greed.' Il-
licit cash proceeds are injected into the financial system, aggregated into
one or more accounts of seemingly legitimate business ventures, and then
"wired" to anywhere in the world.'
Efforts by government authorities worldwide to curb such abuses
have become a higher priority recently.' These efforts are directed toward
both currency and non-currency transactions. Efforts in the non-currency
area are creating a dilemma for government officials and financial institu-
tions, as many of these illicit transactions appear deceptively similar to
legitimate banking transactions.9 Regulation of this highly efficient and
beneficial system of wire transfers must be deliberatively and carefully
weighed against the burden placed on the legitimate businesses affected.
This article describes the wire transfer process, money laundering mitiga-
tion efforts and recent proposals by the United States Treasury
Department.
5. U.S. electronic funds transfer systems process over $1.2 trillion dollars daily. See
infra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
6. Gerald Lewis, Comptroller, State of Florida, Speech to the International Sympo-
sium on Money Laundering, Coral Gables, Florida, sponsored by the University of Miami's
Graduate School of International Studies (Oct. 26, 1989), reprinted in Drug Money Laun-
dering Control Efforts: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Consumer and Regulatory Affairs
of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 492
(1989) [hereinafter Control Efforts].
7. As drug peddlers expand their markets, they also diversify their money laundering
techniques. Law enforcement agencies are discovering money laundering activity in enter-
prises not usually associated with such activity. For example, beauty salons, camera shops,
car rentals, dry cleaners, movie houses, fitness clubs, pet shops and even grocery stores are
utilized as legitimate business fronts to facilitate the infusion of large amounts of cash into
the international payments system. Id. at 26.
8. Examples of such efforts include: the United Nations Vienna Convention Against
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (December, 1988); IN-
TERPOL; the Basel Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices (com-
prised of central bank governors); the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CI-
CAD) of the Organization of American States; and the Financial Action Task Force,
established at the July, 1989 Paris Economic Summit of G-7 Countries and the President
and Commission of the European Community. Also invited to participate in the Task Force
were Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, Hong
Kong and the Gulf Cooperation Council. In April of 1990, the Task Force issued a report
containing forty recommendations for an international effort to combat money laundering;
see 1991 GAO Report, supra note 3, at 58-63. See generally Laura M. L. Maroldy, Record-
keeping and Reporting in an Attempt to Stop the Money Laundering Cycle: Why Blanket
Reporting and Recording of Wire and Electronic Funds Transfers is Not the Answer, 66
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 863 (1991) [hereinafter Blanket Reporting]; Jeffrey Lowell Quillen,
Note, The International Attack on Money Laundering: European Initiatives, 1991 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 213 (1991) [hereinafter European Initiatives].
9. See Control Efforts, supra note 6, at 81-88 (testimony of Chuck Morley of the Mor-
ley Group, Inc., financial consultants).
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II. ELECTRONIC FUNDS TRANSFERS' 0
Before the age of microprocessors, funds transfers between banks
were made primarily over international and domestic telegraph and telex
networks." This system was very time consuming and cumbersome.
Telexes were required to be processed manually and there was no stan-
dardized format; each bank typically designed its own forms. 12
Because these telexed instructions were nonuniform, it was not possi-
ble to process transactions without the participation of a human operator
reviewing and interpreting the instructions on the transaction. There was
no standard way to indicate the parties of the payment, the amount, the
currency, the value, the date, etc.. This archaic system was chaotic, re-
quiring a large staff of handlers and voluminous paperwork. 13
Technological advancement in the development and implementation
of computers has both increased the speed by which such wire transfer
transactions can be accomplished and provided for a steady evolution of
standards relating to the communication networks and automated sys-
tems that support the banking industry.' It is now possible to effect
funds transfers that are processed and interpreted entirely electronically,
without the involvement of human translators.
There are three primary communications systems facilitating wire
transfers: the Federal Reserve Communications System ("Fedwire"); the
Clearing House Interbank Payments System ("CHIPS"); and the tele-
communications system run by the Society for Worldwide Interbank Fi-
nancial Telecommunications S.C. ("SWIFT"). Fedwire is the nation's pri-
mary wholesale electronic funds transfer system' 5 utilized by the banking
10. Electronic and wire transfers can move funds in a matter of seconds, because what
is being "moved" is not physical currency, but electronic messages. An authority on elec-
tronic funds transfers noted:
Money itself is nothing but information. It represents the claims that individu-
als and institutions have for goods and services that exist within an economy.
The possession of money in paper form is simply the possession of a certificate
which records these particular claims. The movement of money is the move-
ment of these claims through the accounting records of the financial, industrial
and merchandising communities.
Blanket Recording, supra note 8, at 864 n. 9 (citing D. CHORAFAS, ELECTRONIC FUNDS
TRANSFER (1988)).
11. See Control Efforts, supra note 6, at 89-141 (testimony of Joseph Madison, Presi-
dent of Joseph Madison Associates, Inc., a consulting firm for computer technology for
banks).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. It has been said that these electronic systems have become "the; banking sys-
tem of the global economy. See Philip S. Corwin and Ian W. Macoy, A Comprehensive Look
at Electronic Payments System Risk, BANKING EXPANSION REP., Feb. 5, 1990.
15. "Wholesale electronic funds transfer generally refers to a funds transfer used to
satisfy an immediate, high-dollar obligation or to enable the recipient to make immediate
use of the funds." U.S. GEN. ACCT'G OFC., BRIEFING REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMIT-
TEE ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND FINANCE, COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, HOUSE
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industry to handle the payments banks make to each other on behalf of
themselves and their customers.16 CHIPS is the principal electronic funds
transfer system that supports the international transfer of funds between
the United States and international banks. 17 Together, CHIPS and
Fedwire account for daily transactions of over $1.2 trillion.18 These sys-
tems handle more than ninety-five percent of all wire transfers received
or sent in the world.19 SWIFT is an international message processing sys-
tem that is the mainstay for initiating international electronic funds
transfers through Fedwire and CHIPS.2 0
A. Fedwire
The Fedwire payment network is operated by the U.S. Federal Re-
serve System. Fedwire, in existence in some form since 1918,21 connects
the twelve Federal Reserve Banks and their twenty-five branches (e.g.,
Denver is a branch of the Kansas City Federal Reserve Bank), U.S. gov-
ernment agencies (e.g., Treasury), and some ten thousand depository
institutions.
Fedwire has evolved from a teletype, terminal-based system to to-
day's direct-link, computer-based system.2 2 In 1987, Fedwire processed
about fifty-five million fund transfers with a combined value of $153 tril-
"lion - over $695 billion on average every business day.23 In 1990, this
daily transaction rate was $792.8 billion - with an annual dollar volume
of almost $200 trillion dollars.2 ' Transfers over Fedwire are considered
both immediate and irrevocable because the Federal Reserve guarantees
payment to the recipient financial institution upon completion of the
transfer.21
Fedwire is entirely under the regulatory authority of the Federal Re-
serve System. The Federal Reserve Board examines Fedwire operations
during annual financial examinations of reserve bank activities.26 In addi-
OF REPRESENTATIVES UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ELECTRONIC FUNDS
TRANSFER: INFORMATION ON THREE CRITICAL BANKING SYSTEMS, GAO/IMTEC-89-25BR, at 2,
n. 1 (Feb. 1989) [hereinafter 1989 GAO Briefing].
16. Id. at 2.
17. Id. at 3.
18. See id. at 2-3.
19. Wire Transfer Rules Proposed, 40,000 Are Affected, MONEY LAUNDERING ALERT,
Nov. 1990, at 1.
20. 1989 GAO Briefing, supra note 15, at 2.
21. Id.
22. Control Efforts, supra note 6, at 105 (Madison testimony).
23. 1989 GAO Briefing, supra note 15, at 2.
24. Letter from Philip Corwin, Director and Counsel, American Bankers Association,
to Peter G. Djinis, Acting Director, Office of Financial Enforcement, Department of the
Treasury 5 (Jan. 15, 1991) (comment letter on the Proposed Amendment to Bank Secrecy
Act Regulations Relating to Recordkeeping for Funds Transfers by Banks, on file with the
author) [hereinafter Corwin letter].
25. 1989 GAO Briefing, supra note 15, at 2.
26. Id. at 4.
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tion, internal auditors of the various Federal Reserve district banks con-
duct periodic audits that include a review of Fedwire activities.2
B. CHIPS
CHIPS was created in 1970 and is the nation's major wholesale elec-
tronic funds transfer system for processing international U.S. dollar
transfers among international banks.28 It is a private-sector system which
electronically processes international transactions for about 140 domestic
depository institutions and branch offices of foreign banks. CHIPS moves
dollars between participant banks for transactions, including letters of
credit, collections, reimbursements, foreign exchange, and the sale of
short-term Eurodollar funds. In 1987, the number of CHIPS transfers ap-
proached thirty-two million with a combined value of almost $140 trillion,
or over $554 billion on average every business day.29 In 1990, CHIPS
processed about thirty-seven million transactions valued at $222 trillion."
Regulation of CHIPS is conducted under the combined authority of
the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Reserve System, and the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and is examined every eighteen
months by a team of examiners.3
C. SWIFT
SWIFT came into being in 1977 and is designed to facilitate the elec-
tronic communications needs of international banking.32 The Society for
Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications S.C. operates the
SWIFT telecommunications system, which was created to provide inter-
national automated message processing and transmission services be-
tween banks. It is a Belgian cooperative society that is owned and man-
aged by almost 1500 financial institutions worldwide.3 SWIFT is not a
system for the transfer of funds, but of information via messages, which
allow institutions to transmit among themselves instructions on interna-
tional payments, statements and other transactions associated with inter-
national finance. The SWIFT system connects about 2400 institutions,
including non-banking institutions, in almost sixty countries. It processes
about one million messages daily relating to fund transfers accomplished
27. Id. at 5.
28. Id. at 3.
29. Id.
30. 1991 GAO Report, supra note 3, at 13.
31. The authority to review CHIPS is dictated by the Bank Service Corporation Act of
1962, 12 U.S.C. § 1867. This Act generally governs the "backroom" operations of banks that
are under the authority of the various federal regulators, including such activities as clerical,
accounting, and statistical functions. CHIPS officials dispute whether there is specific statu-
tory authority within the Act for this examination. However, the officials have taken it upon
themselves to allow such investigations by formally "inviting" the examiners. This coopera-
tion has eliminated the need to settle the dispute. 1989 GAO Briefing, supra note 15, at 5.
32. Id. at 3.
33. Id.
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through Fedwire and CHIPS.3 4
SWIFT is not subject to U.S. federal regulation. Examination of
SWIFT operations is carried out by in-house auditors on a periodic basis.
Additionally, an annual review is conducted by private, outside-auditors
to assure the integrity of the security and confidentiality of SWIFT
messages.3 5
D. Private Networks
Many large money center banks have developed private networks in
response to customers' cash management needs and to assist in their for-
eign branch and correspondent operations. These networks are offered to
corporate customers and to "correspondent" banks, typically smaller
banks utilizing the resources of their larger cousins, for a fee of course."
Thus, even the smallest of depository institutions can access and transmit
funds for their customers or for their own accounts through the complex,
sophisticated international network of wire transfers.3 7 The American
Bankers Association has developed standards for its members so that
these private networks for funds transfer are compatible with SWIFT,
CHIPS and Fedwire. In fact, CHIPS and Fedwire implemented the ABA
standards, which were essentially derived from SWIFT.3s
All of the above systems are fully compatible, integrated and auto-
mated. They are utilized singularly and in unison to effect funds transfers
in tremendous volume virtually instantaneously on a worldwide basis,
from and to any place on the globe.3 9 The standardization of national
34. Id. at 4.
35. See id. at 4-6.
36. Control Efforts, supra note 6, at 108 (Madison testimony).
37. Such private systems include: Bankers Trust Cash Connector; Morgan Guaranty's
MARS; Chase Manhattan's Current Day Reporter; Chemical Bank's CHEMLINK; and First
National Bank of Chicago's FirstCash systems. Id.
38. Control Efforts, supra note 6, at 118 (Madison testimony).
39. 1989 GAO Briefing, supra note 15, app. I. Some examples of this interconnection
are as follows:
Example 1, Domestic: A Washington D.C. purchaser buys $2 million in goods from a
Los Angeles manufacturer. He goes to his bank to initiate a payment order. The purchaser's
bank, a member of the Federal Reserve, is linked to Fedwire and uses a computer terminal
to send a funds transfer message to its district Federal Reserve Bank in Richmond, Va.
Automatically proceeding over Fedwire to the manufacturer's Federal Reserve district bank
in San Francisco, the funds transfer message is then instantaneously sent to the manufac-
turer's local bank in Los Angeles via Fedwire. The local bank credits the manufacturer's
account immediately. Non-Federal Reserve member banks can accomplish the same through
a correspondent relationship with a member bank or through a private system. Id.
Example 2, International: A British importer orders goods from a French manufac-
turer to be paid in U.S. dollars. After the goods have been received, the British importer
instructs its London bank to send payment to the French manufacturer's bank in Paris. The
London bank uses the SWIFT system to advise its New York branch office to send payment
to the manufacturer's French bank. The electronic funds transfer is sent through CHIPS to
the New York branch of the French bank. The New York branch office of the French bank
VOL. 20:3
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laws generally affecting these international electronic funds transfers is a
topic which has been the subject of extensive discussion over the past
several years40 and which in itself is a suitable basis for an entire article;
it is not pursued further here.4 '
III. MONEY LAUNDERING
The above-described systems for instantaneously moving funds
around the globe have proven quite attractive to those who illicitly accu-
mulate and distribute large amounts of cash. Although estimates on the
exact amount of funds vary, authorities believe that up to $85 billion of
over $120 billion of drug money proceeds are laundered or invested
annually.42
Money laundering has been defined as "the process whereby one con-
ceals the existence, illegal source, or illegal application of income, and
then disguises that income to make it appear legitimate.""3 Illegal drug
notifies its Paris office through SWIFT of the receipt of payment. The Paris bank credits
the manufacturer's account. Id.
Example 3, International: A Los Angeles importer instructs its local bank to send pay-
ment to a Paris manufacturer for goods received. The Los Angeles importer's bank, linked
to Fedwire, sends a funds transfer message to its district Federal Reserve Bank in San Fran-
cisco. This message automatically goes to the Federal Reserve Bank in New York. The mes-
sage is automatically relayed via Fedwire to a New York correspondent bank of the Paris
bank. The correspondent bank advises the manufacturer's bank in Paris via SWIFT to send
payment to the French manufacturer. The payment order is received by the manufacturer's
Paris bank and the funds are available on demand from the manufacturer. Id.
40. The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) has
undertaken a project to prepare a model national law on electronic funds transfers. The U.S.
Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on Private International Law Study Group on In-
ternational Electronic Transactions has met and considered various proposals for position-
ing the U.S. delegation to this UNCITRAL project. The U.S. delegation will be advocating
adoption of a model national law which is essentially Article 4A of the Uniform Commercial
Code of the U.S.. Telephone conversation with Harold S. Burman, Office of the Legal Ad-
viser, U.S. Department of State, on December 20, 1991.
41. For a more in-depth analysis of the problems of disparate treatment under inter-
national law because of a lack of uniform standards for wire transfers, see Jeffrey S. Tallack-
son and Norma Vallejo, International Commercial Wire Transfers: The Lack of Standards,
11 N.C. J. INT'L & COM. REG. 639 (1986), and Shawn E. Flatt, Citibank, N.A. v. Wells Fargo
Asia LTD.: A Threat to U.S. International Banking?, 1991 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 241
(1991).
42. Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, Report of February 7, 1990, at
3-4 (on file with the author) (G-7 and other invited countries convened to work towards
unified international proscriptions for money laundering); see also 1991 GAO Report, supra
note 3, at 12.
43. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON ORGANIZED CRIME, INTERIM REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT
AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, THE CASH CONNECTION: ORGANIZED CRIME, FINANCIAL INSTITU-
TIONS AND MONEY LAUNDERING, at 7 (1984) [hereinafter THE CASH CONNECTION]. Though the
legitimate world payments systems have fostered the evolution of a relatively cashless soci-
ety, cash has assumed an even greater importance as the medium of exchange within the
criminal world. Jonathan J. Rusch, Hue and Cry in the Counting House: Some Observa-
tions on the Bank Secrecy Act, 37 CATH. U.L. REV. 465 (1988); Changes in the Use of
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money proceeds derived from sales of cocaine, heroin and cannabis cer-
tainly constitute a major portion of the illicit cash proceeds that are in-
jected into the financial system; however, activities such as illegal gam-
bling, extortion, bribery, loansharking and prostitution also generate large
amounts of cash needing to be legitimized." Money laundering could also
be used by a corporation seeking to cover the trail of bribery money paid
to foreign officials in violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act."5
Electronic funds transfers can be and are used by criminals to laun-
der money. It has been said that wire transfers "have emerged as the pri-
mary method by which high-volume money launderers ply their trade.""6
Wire transfers, however, are not the only way to move illicit money;
"dirty money" can be moved into international channels in myriad ways.
The most pervasive method of laundering money is physically smuggling
currency and/or financial instruments across borders.4 7 Money can also be
laundered internationally by purchasing commodities such as cars, appli-
ances, or precious metals and shipping them abroad to be sold for local
currency, or by fraudulently invoicing international commercial
transactions.4
Currently, the normal system of money laundering consists of cash
being moved into banks and other financial institutions and then being
wired offshore or to other domestic banks for the purchase of assets.4 In
some areas, money launderers have injected large volumes of cash into
real estate markets; drug traffickers make large cash down payments, and
full price purchases of real estate. The impact of this activity distorts true
market conditions, as these, purchases are typically at inflated prices." An
example of this would be as follows: A launderer creates an apparently
legal property management firm in the United States. This management
firm manages property of "third parties." The launderers aggregate cur-
rency, send it offshore, put it through a series of offshore money launder-
ing havens, then bring the funds back into the United States as loans, or
as investment funds that are used to buy real estate that the management
company sells and then manages."
Transaction Accounts and Cash from 1984 to 1986, 73 FED. RES. BULL. 179, 191 (1987)
(almost 90% of the total $177.4 billion of coin and currency in circulation outside banks was
"apparently held in unreported hoards, 'underground' for illegal purposes, or offshore").
44. See Blanket Reporting, supra note 8, at 865.
45. 15 U.S.C. § 78(dd-1) (unlawful to make payment or the promise of payment by
any means to a foreign official for the purposes of influencing an act or decision of the
official in his official capacity).
46. Rebecca Cox, New Path for Money Laundering, THE AMERICAN BANKER, July 24,
1989, at 9 (letter from Donald G. Ogilvie, Executive Vice President, American. Bankers As-
sociation to William J. Bennett ("Drug Czar"), then-director of the Office of National Drug
Control Policy).
47. 1991 GAO Report, supra note 3, at 14.
48. Id.
49. Control Efforts, supra note 6, at 81 (Morley testimony).
50. Id. at 26 (testimony of Gerald Lewis).
51. Id. at 81 (Morley testimony).
VOL. 20:3
INTERNATIONAL WIRE TRANSFER
Identifying the amount of illegal funds that are laundered interna-
tionally is difficult. Huge sums are transferred electronically each day in
connection with conventional banking activities such as collections, reim-
bursements, letters of credit and foreign exchange transactions." The
large volume of currency and monetary instruments that legitimately
traverse borders make identifying illegal funds difficult, since these funds
are often mixed with and are indistinguishable from legitimate currency,
cashier's check and bearer bond transactions."
While cash provides criminal enterprises with a ready medium of ex-
change, the sheer physical volume of such mountains of paper can prove
quite a challenge. According to U.S. Customs Service reports, U.S. cur-
rency notes weigh about one gram each, with about 450 bills to the
pound." ' Fifty pounds of ten-dollar bills is $227,000. A million dollars in
twenty-dollar bills weighs 113 pounds.56 Because of this logistical prob-
lem, money laundering has become increasingly sophisticated and is
evolving into a highly specialized field. Illicit transactions are more and
more often being carried out by independent money laundering experts
working for a percentage of the laundered funds.5 7
Typical money laundering activities follow three basic steps: place-
ment, layering and integration." Placement implements the physical dis-
posal of bulk currency through various means, including the commingling
of funds with legitimate business proceeds, smuggling and converting
cash into deposits or assets at banks.5 9 Due to statutory and regulatory
requirements of reporting currency transactions of $10,000 or more,60 this
process can involve "structuring"" where deposits are made in incre-
ments of less than $10,000, or "smurfing," in which couriers, or "smurfs,"
make multiple purchases of money orders, cashiers checks, or other finan-
52. 1991 GAO Report, supra note 3, at 13.
53. U.S. Customs Service data show that during 1989, almost $56 billion in cash and
monetary instruments moved into and out of the United States. This figure is most likely
understated, because many legitimate and routine international banking transactions are
currently exempt from the reporting requirement of the Bank Secrecy Act. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Money Laundering in Florida: Banking Compliance, Federal Enforcement Mea-
sures, and the Efficacy of Current Law, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Consumer
and Regulatory Affairs of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs,
101st Cong., 1st Sess. 500 (1989) (statement of Charles Intriago, Publisher, Money Launder-
ing Alert) (how Federal agencies assigned to money laundering operations carry out their
assignments in Florida, what statutory tools they use to carry out their investigations, and
the particular problems financial institutions face when operating in a region known to be a
major port of entry for drugs and a major port of exit for drug profits) [hereinafter Money
Laundering in Florida].
57. 1991 GAO Report, supra note 3, at 13.
58. Id. at 14.
59. Id.
60. See infra note 75 and accompanying text.
61. 1991 GAO Report, supra note 3, at 14 n.1.
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cial instruments in smaller increments.6 2
This infusion of cash into the legitimate economy is the most critical
for criminal enterprise. Banks are not the only conduit for this infusion;
launderers also utilize other financial institutions such as casinos, check
cashing establishments, currency exchanges, and securities brokers, as
well as non-traditional channels such as underground banking systems
that deal in barter that are prevalent in the Republics of the former So-
viet and Eastern block nations where official economies are in shambles. 63
Layering is aggregating funds within accounts and transferring those
funds electronically. 4 Integration occurs when the laundered funds are
injected back into the legitimate economies, apparently derived from le-
gal sources such as real estate deals, loans from front companies and
fraudulent import and export invoicing as discussed above.65 The only
difference between criminal and legitimate transactions at this point is
the initial source of the cash. To identify what is, in fact, a money laun-
dering operation, one must associate the funds involved, or the person
controlling, depositing or transferring those funds, with some illegal
activity.6
The magnitude of criminally sophisticated manipulation of otherwise
legitimate commercial pathways has caused great consternation within
governments and the private sector worldwide. Over the past twenty-five
years, statutes, regulations and private efforts to curb such abuses have
been enacted, yet the problems persist. New initiatives have been enacted
and proposed to enhance the effectiveness of past efforts.
IV. GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO CURB MONEY LAUNDERING
"Without the ability to freely utilize its ill-gotten gains, the under-
world will have been dealt a crippling blow."6 7 Attacking the profits of the
drug trade is predicted to eventually prove more effective in combating
drugs in society than all other combined efforts on eradication and in-
terdiction.6 8 There is increasing pressure internationally to clamp down
on drug money laundering and its accompanying scandals, such as the
one concerning the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI).
The government of Japan, 9 the European Community," Central and
62. Id. Originally, "smurfs" referred to small numerous gnome-like cartoon characters
with blue complexions. I could not locate the origin of use in this context, but it is a com-
mon reference for this particular type of laundering technique.
63. See generally 1991 GAO Report, supra note 3, at 14.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Blanket Reporting, supra note 8, at 867.
67. THE CASH CONNECTION, supra note 43, at iii (statement of Irving R. Kaufman,
Chairman of the President's Commission on Organized Crime); see also Blanket Reporting,
supra note 8, at 863.
68. 137 CONG. REc. 4203, 4206 (daily ed. June 10, 1991) (statement by Congressman
Annunzio).
69. Teenage Drug Abuse Grows Rapidly in Japan, The Reuter Library Report, Au-
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South American nations," as well as the federal and state governments in
the United States7" are undertaking to broaden and strengthen money
laundering controls. The banking industry itself has begun massive efforts
to curb abuses.7 3
A. United States
The core statutory enactments governing currency transaction re-
porting and recordkeeping are found within the provisions of the Bank
Secrecy Act,7 administrated by the Department of the Treasury. These
provisions are designed to assist in the detection and prosecution of
money laundering violations through the collection and in some cases re-
porting of data which is available to enforcement officials within the U.S.
Customs Service, Internal Revenue Service, Office of Financial Enforce-
ment, the Department of Justice and the Office of Financial Crime En-
forcement Network (FINCEN).7 5
gust 13, 1991 ("Police have drafted new regulations to control money-laundering related to
drugs and stricter laws against gangsters involved in the business. Parliament is expected to
approve the regulations later this year.").
70. See generally European Initiatives, supra note 8; see also Banking and Financial
Services, European Update, November 28, 1991 at 59-67, available in WESTLAW,
Eurupdate database [hereinafter European Update].
71. The Document of Cartegena, signed by the presidents of Columbia, Peru, Bolivia
and the United States at the February 1990 Andean Summit, included provisions under
which the parties agreed to:
* identify, trace, freeze, and seize drug money proceeds;
* attack the financial aspects of the drug trade;
* criminalize money laundering;
* provide exceptions to banking secrecy; and
* implement a system for forfeiting and sharing drug proceeds.
Also, a panel was established at the 1990 Organization of American States Ministerial Meet-
ing to draft model regulations concerning criminalization of money laundering, asset seizure
and currency transaction reporting. 1991 GAO Report, supra note 3, at 62.
72. See, e.g., N.Y Enacts Law Aimed at Illegal Transmitters, MONEY LAUNDERING
ALERT, Aug. 1990, at 8 (broadened definition of "financial institution" in state penal code to
'include unlicensed money transmitters, auto and boat sellers, and real estate brokers).
73. In January of 1989, the American Bankers Association established the Money
Laundering Task Force to address all possible methods of stopping the flow of illicit funds.
Corwin letter, supra note 24, at 2.
74. Amendments to the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (Bank Secrecy Act) Titles I
and III, Pub. L. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114-1124 (1970), codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1730(d), 1829(b),
1951-1959; 18 U.S.C. § 6002; 31 U.S.C. § 321, 5311-5314, 5316-5322 (1988).
75. The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FINCEN) was established by order
the Secretary of the Treasury to provide a government-wide, multisource intelligence and
analytical network in support of the detection, investigation, and prosecution of domestic
and international money laundering and other financial crimes by federal, state, local and
foreign law enforcement agencies. It is important to note that FINCEN has no authority to
conduct independent investigations but is designed to assist, with tactical and strategic in-
formation resources, those organizations with proper investigatory authority. See Organiza-
tion, Functions, and Authority Delegations: Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, 55 Fed.
Reg. 18433-03 (1990) (Dept. of Treasury Notice); see also U.S GEN. ACCT'G OFC., REPORT TO
THE CHAIRMAN AND RANKING MINORITY MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TREASURY, POSTAL SER-
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The Bank Secrecy Act reporting requirements include the Currency
Transaction Report (CTRs) and the Report of International Transporta-
tion of Currency or Monetary Instruments (CMIRs). 76 Generally, CTRs
and CMIRs are required when customers of financial institutions make
transactions at or exceeding $10,000 dollars in currency, or in the case of
CMIRs, of currency or financial instruments of any kind that are trans-
ported into or out of the United States. The Act also requires the Report
of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts, which must be filed by persons
with signature authority or a financial interest in foreign bank security or
deposit accounts at or exceeding $10,000 dollars.
Financial institutions7" must file these currency transaction reports
with the Internal Revenue Service within fifteen days following the re-
portable transaction.7" CMIR reports are filed with the Commissioner of
Customs. If currency is transported, the filing must occur at the time of
entry into the United States." The recipient is required to file within
fifteen days of receipt.8 0
Financial institutions must provide the identity and the occupation
of the individual who conducted the transaction with the financial insti-
tution, the identity of the individual on whose behalf the transaction was
VICE AND GENERAL GOVERNMENT, COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, U.S. SENATE, MONEY LAUN-
DERING: TREASURY'S FINANCIAL CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, GAO/GGD-91-53 (Mar.
1991).
76. 31 U.S.C. §§ 321, 5311-5314, 5316-5322 (1988).
77. "Financial Institution" is defined by the regulations to mean:
... each agent, agency, branch, or office within the United States of any
person doing business, whether or not on a regular basis or as an organized
business concern, in one or more of the capacities listed below:
(1) a bank (except bank credit card systems);
(2) a broker or dealer in securities;
(3) a currency dealer or exchanger, including persons engaged in the busi-
ness of check cashing;
(4) an issuer, seller or redeemer of travelers checks or money orders, ex-
cept as a selling agent exclusively who does not sell more than $150,000 of such
instruments within a given 30 day period;
(5) a licensed transmitter of funds, or other person engaged in the business
of transmitting funds;
(6) a telegraph company;
(7)(i) a casino or gambling casino licensed as a casino or gambling casino
by a state or local government and having gross annual gaming revenue in ex-
cess of $1 million;
(7)(ii) a casino or gambling casino includes the principle headquarters and
any branch or place of business of the casino or gambling casino;
(8) a person subject to supervision by any state or federal bank supervi-
sory authority;
(9) the United States Postal Service with respect to the sale of money
orders.
31 C.F.R. § 103.11(i) (1991).
78. 31 C.F.R. § 103.27 (1991).
79. 31 C.F.R. § 103.23 (1991).
80. Id.
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conducted, the account number involved in the transaction, and a
description of the transaction."'
The Bank Secrecy Act recordkeeping and reporting requirements ap-
ply only to domestic financial institutions and foreign banking entities
doing business in the United States. The Act does not extend to financial
institutions offshore, even if it is a branch of a U.S. institution doing busi-
ness outside U.S. borders.8 2
While the Bank Secrecy Act was enacted in 1970, enforcement was
virtually non-existent until the mid-1980s. The Bank Secrecy Act was
originally designed to help deter white collar crime, such as income tax
evasion, by furnishing law enforcement officials with greater evidence of
illegal finincial transactions.8 3 In 1985, the U.S. Senate Permanent Sub-
committee on Investigations fully disclosed the money laundering scandal
at the Bank of Boston. The impact of this scandal on compliance was
dramatic: CTR filings by financial institutions in 1984 numbered only
700,000, but in 1989 reached almost seven million.84
The Bank Secrecy Act regulations authorize the Secretary of the
Treasury to "target" transactions with certain foreign institutions 85 and
transactions of domestic financial institutions that take place in certain
geographic regions of the United States. 6 These additional regulations
provide the Secretary with broad discretion to channel his resources to
particular institutions and regions that might be more prone to abuses
81. Blanket Reporting, supra note 8, at 873.
82. 1991 GAO Report, supra note 3, at 15 (Foreign banks and foreign branches of U.S.
banks are subject to host country regulations. Such reporting could violate host country
secrecy laws.).
83. Cliff E. Cook, Complying with the Spirit of BSA: "Know Your Customer" Policies
and Suspicious Transactions Reporting, ABA BANK COMPLIANCE, Summer 1991, at 7 [here-
inafter Know Your Customer].
84. Control Efforts, supra note 6, at 85 (Morley testimony).
85. 31 C.F.R. § 103.25(a) (1991) (the Secretary, when he deems appropriate, may pro-
mulgate regulations requiring specified financial institutions to file reports of certain trans-
actions with designated foreign financial agencies).
86. If the Secretary of the Treasury finds, upon the Secretary's own initiative or
at the request of an appropriate Federal or State law enforcement official, that
reasonable grounds exist for concluding that additional recordkeeping and/or
reporting requirements are necessary to carry out the purposes of this part ...
the Secretary may issue an order requiring any domestic financial institutions
in a geographic area and any other person participating in the type of transac-
tion to file a report. ...
31 C.F.R. § 103.26(a) (1991).
"Geographic Area" means any area in one or more States of the United
States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the
United States Virgin Islands, Guam, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mari-
ana Islands, American Samoa, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, the
territories and possessions of the United States, and/or political subdivisions or
subdivisions thereof.. .
31 C.F.R. § 103.26(d)(4) (1991).
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and illicit manipulation.8 7
Adding to the arsenal of federal statutory weapons to fight money
laundering was the enactment of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986,88 the
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 198889 and the Crime Control Act of 1990.90 The
1986 Act contained a provision finally making the laundering of money a
crime. 1 Specifically, 31 U.S.C. § 1956 provides for a "financial transac-
tions" offense and a "monetary transportation" offense for the transpor-
tation of monetary instruments other than currency. Also, 31 U.S.C. §
1957 specifically prohibits the knowing engagement in transactions con-
sisting of criminally derived assets valued in excess of $10,000. Included
under this Subtitle is a provision prohibiting "structured" transactions
and a directive to financial regulators to impose regulations requiring
their wards to establish and maintain internal mechanisms to ensure
compliance.2
Title II of the 1986 Act mandates economic sanctions against foreign
nations involved in the production or transmission of drugs. 3 Under this
section, the President may waive sanctions by certifying to Congress that
these nations are cooperating with U.S. narcotics control efforts and are
taking adequate steps to eliminate, "to the maximum extent possible,"
the laundering of drug profits. The President may also waive sanctions if
it is in the vital national interest of the United States.9 4
The 1988 Act Amendments enacted several provisions to bolster fed-
eral programs for the coordination and cooperation of money laundering
mitigation efforts with foreign countries. The Secretary of the Treasury is
directed by 31 U.S.C. § 5311 to negotiate with foreign finance ministers
toward the establishment of an international currency control agency.
Section 5311 also requires that the Secretary negotiate agreements with
foreign countries regarding recordkeeping for large U.S. currency transac-
tions and their disclosure to U.S. law enforcement officials.
Penalties for non-compliance with the above provisions are stiff;95
civil penalties of up to $100,000 or the amount involved in the transaction
can be imposed for a single violation, and criminal penalties of up to
$500,000 in fines and/or ten years in jail are authorized for willful viola-
tions."' Banks are more than encouraged to comply.
As is evident, currency transaction recordkeeping and reporting are
87. Blanket Reporting, supra note 8 at 874-880.
88. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 26 (1986).
89. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988).
90. Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4789 (1990).
91. The Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1352, 100 Stat.
3207-18, 18-21 (1986).
92. Id. at §§ 1354, 1359.
93. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, supra note 88, at § 2005.
94. Id.
95. See Blanket Reporting, supra note 8, at 879-881.
96. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 5321, 5322.
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the primary focus of U.S. efforts. In October of 1989, the Treasury De-
partment filed an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to address the
problem of money laundering through international payments through
wire transfers. 7 Citing authority under the Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C.
§§ 5314 and 5318(a)(2), and the commensurate regulations under 31
C.F.R. § 103, whereby the Secretary "may require reports or records re-
lating to transactions between persons subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States and foreign financial agencies," and that domestic financial
institutions "maintain appropriate procedures" to ensure compliance with
any regulation proscribed, Treasury proposed these regulations to address
the continuing problem of money laundering.9 8 Under these proposed reg-
ulations, domestic financial institutions would be required to keep a rec-
ord of each international transaction over $10,000, including international
wire transfers of funds and book transfers of credit.9 The Department of
the Treasury also solicited comments from financial institutions concern-
ing ways in which Treasury could utilize efforts undertaken within the
private sector, such as the "know your customer" procedures.' On Octo-
ber 15, 1990, the Treasury Department issued a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking10 ' setting out its proposals for amending 31 C.F.R. § 103. In-
cluded in the proposed Rulemaking are amendments to 31 C.F.R.
§ 103.25, the foreign financial agencies targeting, and 31 C.F.R. § 103.33,
effecting mandatory recordkeeping by financial institutions. The Notice
also included proposed amendments to the definitions in the regulations,
31 C.F.R. § 103.11."0 These proposals would require recordkeeping of,
but not the reporting of, electronic funds transfers conducted by a
bank.'03 Non-bank purveyors of currency and monetary instruments
97. Bank Secrecy Act Regulatory Applications to the Problem of Money Laundering
Through International Payments, 54 FED. REG. 45769 (1989) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R.
103).
98. Id. at 45770.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 45771; see also Know Your Customer, supra note 83, at 7. Know your cus-
tomer policies basically require financial institutions to require complete and thorough iden-
tification upon opening account with follow-up procedures for the institution to become fa-
miliar with the types of services utilized and potential needs of this account holder. Any
deviation from a pattern thus established would be "suspicious," and could be flagged and
reported.
101. Proposed Amendment to the Bank Secrecy Act Regulations Relating to Record-
keeping for Funds Transfers by Banks and Transmittals of Funds by Other Financial In-
stitutions, 55 Fed. Reg. 41,696 (1990) [hereinafter Proposed Rulemaking].
102. Id. at 41699.
103. Banks would be required to retain the following information for each funds
transfer:
(1) The name of the originator of the payment order, and the originators
account number, if applicable;
(2) unless the originator is a publicly traded corporation, public utility, or
government agency, the name of any person on whose behalf the funds transfer
was originated, if different from the originator at (1);
(3) the amount of the funds transfer;
(4) the execution date of the funds transfer;
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would also be subject to record retention for transmittals or receipts of
funds. Non-bank institutions subject to these proposed regulations would
include telegraph offices, travel agencies and check cashing companies.' 4
If a non-account holder requests a transfer, the bank must verify the
name and address of the person originating the transfer and maintain a
separate record of the person's name, address, social security number and
date of birth.0 5 These proposals are designed to standardize the currently
inconsistent recordkeeping required under existing regulations.
It is estimated that 40,000 institutions will be required to be in com-
pliance with these proposed regulations.'0 6 Treasury received over 400
comments from a variety of sources including banks, securities brokers,
Western Union, American Express, check cashing services, travel agencies
and anyone who might transmit funds by electronic impulse.107 It is an
understatement to say that these proposed regulations are not being re-
ceived with open arms in the financial community. They have evoked al-
most unanimous opposition and sparked a flurry of protest regarding the
burdens, costs, utility and impact of these rules.'0 8 According to the De-
partment of the Treasury, most comments noted that the essence of the
automated international payments system is the speed with which it
moves funds and that any regulation which would impede this efficiency
would make United States banks less competitive. 0 9
The Bankers Association for Foreign Trade (BAFT) filed one of the
most comprehensive comments stating that the proposals fail to meet the
required standards of a Reagan Administration executive order requiring
federal agencies to measure proposed regulations under two standards:
that they be a part of a cohesive, practical and effective strategy and that
they should meet a rational cost-benefit analysis."0 BAFT contends that
these regulations will cost financial institutions in excess of $100 million
annually for increased compliance and lost revenues and that the pro-
(5) the payment instructions, if any;
(6) the identity of the beneficiary's bank; and
(7) the name of the beneficiary of the payment order, and the account
number if applicable.
Id.
104. Id. at 41700.
105. Id. at 41701.
106. Cost, Utility of Wire Transfer Regulation Questioned, MONEY LAUNDERING
ALERT, Feb. 1991, at 6 [hereinafter Regulation Questioned].
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 101.
110. Regulation Questioned, supra note 106, at 6. CHIPS' comment stressed that the
U.S. dollar in recent years has been challenged in its primacy by the yen and the mark.
CHIPs maintains that it has kept its position as the primary conduit of foreign wire trans-
fers because the mechanisms for making dollar payments are the most secure and efficient
in the world. It emphasized that to jeopardize that situation would not be in the long-term
interests of the U.S. because movement by the European Community toward a common
currency could pose a significant challenge to the dollar's status. Id.
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posed regulations would significantly and adversely effect competition
and U.S.-based business' ability to compete with foreign competition."'
It was estimated that the 300 largest U.S. banks would incur start-up and
first year implementation expenses of over $160 million dollars." 2
The American Bankers Association, in its letter of comment to the
Department of the Treasury on the proposed Rulemaking summarized its
concerns as follows.
- The proposal, if implemented, would likely be circumvented by
money launderers using the funds transfer mechanism by providing
erroneous and unverifiable information.
- The costs borne by the banking industry to comply with this pro-
posal would easily exceed $120 million at a time when the banking
industry is facing other substantial Bank Secrecy Act related compli-
ance costs and declining profitability.
- Users of the highly efficient large-dollar funds transfer mechanism
would face increasing costs and decreased efficiency, thus diminishing
the competitiveness of domestic financial institutions, hampering U.S.
dollar-denominated trade, and encouraging offshore netting and set-
tlement of U.S. dollar transactions.
- Many of the aspects of the proposal are inconsistent with existing
funds transfer conventions and law.
- Money laundering activity represents an extremely small propor-
tion of both the number of transactions and dollar volume conveyed
by the transfers. Treasury's confinement of exempted transfers to just
those between domestic banks for their own accounts is too limited."'
There are other problems with the proposed regulations. One such
problem is that there is apparent conflict with long established norms and
conventions that have governed party rights and obligations. Article 4A of
the Uniform Commercial Code specifies the duties of an "originator's"
bank and a "beneficiary's" bank and the time frames for taking certain
actions."" At a time when the Department of State will be pushing for
international adoption of Article 4A as the model national law in the UN-
CITRAL meetings, it seems inconsistent at best for Treasury to be en-
dorsing efforts which undermine the Code's predictability and
integrity." 5
The Proposed Rulemaking contains a requirement that the originat-
ing bank determine from the originator the name of the person or persons
"on whose behalf" the person is acting before executing the payment or-
der. Additionally, the rules would require the beneficiary's bank to with-
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Corwin letter, supra note 24, at 1-2.
114. See U.C.C. art. 4A § 207, and comments 1-9.
115. Telephone discussion with Harold S. Burman, supra note 40.
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hold payment to a non-deposit account holder beneficiary if such infor-
mation is absent.1 6 This proposal directly contradicts the orderly process
outlined within Article 4A-207. The confusion, potential liability and
commensurate cost of the delays inherent in this proposal are staggering
to imagine.
Another difficulty with the Proposed Rulemaking is that a particular
monetary threshold triggering compliance is not provided. Regardless of
whether the amount is $1.00, $10.00, $100 or $1,000,000 dollars, financial
institutions will be required to record the mandatory data. While this
provision appears to be aimed at the prevention of "structuring" laun-
dered money in any size increment, it will place an inordinate burden on
institutions to keep detailed data on far more transactions than presently
recorded. This makes little sense, since it is hardly plausible that a
"smurf' would be laundering millions in increments of one hundred
dollars.
The Proposed Rulemaking has yet to be issued in its final form. It
was predicted that the final form might have materialized as early as late
January, 1992;11 however, President Bush's State of the Union morato-
rium for ninety days on the enactment of federal regulations has fur-
thered delayed its arrival. Previously, however, such release dates have
been suggested and not been met for many months. In fact, the delay now
of almost two years since the Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on
this issue has frustrated Congress to the point of introducing mandatory
release dates.' The issue has been further complicated by the Treasury
Department's release of yet additional proposals set forth under the Bank
Secrecy Act to combat money laundering. These proposals govern the
daily aggregation of cash transactions by or on behalf of an accountholder
and magnetic filing of currency transaction reports by certain financial
institutions." 9
116. See Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 83.
117. Telephone discussion with Pamela Johnson, Director of Compliance, Office of Fi-
nancial Enforcement, Department of the Treasury, December 26, 1991. This timeframe was
confirmed by John Byrne, Chief Counsel, American Bankers Association, and Lamar Smith,
Minority Chief of Staff, Senate Committee on Banking Housing and Urban Affairs.
118. See Treasury May Have FED for Partner on Money Laundering Rule, Attorney
Says, BNA's BANKING REPORT, Aug. 19, 1991 at 290 (S. 543 and H.R. 26, mandating Trea-
sury to work with the Federal Reserve to issue joint rules on money laundering by a speci-
fied date). Note that provisions on money laundering were stripped from the ultimate ver-
sion of the banking bill prior to final passage during the last session of Congress. Compare
H.R. 26 with the amended S. 543, P.L. 101-242, the final enacted measure. Also, as of the
final edit of this article, there were discussions on renewing indefinitely the current morato-
rium on federal regulations implementation.
119. See Mandatory Aggregation of Currency Transactions for Certain Financial Insti-
tutions and Mandatory Magnetic Reporting of Currency Transaction Reports, 55 Fed. Reg.
36663 (1990).
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V. ALTERNATIVES TO RECORDKEEPING
Present regulations requiring currency transaction reporting produce
a quantity of records so vast that the government has neither the re-
sources or the inclination to utilize the information they currently ob-
tain. 20 Even the Attorney General of the United States expressed his
concern over the vast expansion of reports being filed with the govern-
ment. In a speech before the New York convention of the American
Bankers Association in October of 1989, Attorney General Richard
Thornburgh stated that because of the tremendous increase in the num-
ber of reports filed, "In equal candor, I must admit that these millions are
now part of the problem as well as the solution."'' 21 The Treasury Depart-
ment seems to have taken the comments of the former Attorney General
to heart and are now requiring that the vast and costly mountains of in-
formation that will be generated not be reported to Treasury, but be
maintained within the institutions themselves. The primary problem with
broadly based reporting and recordkeeping requirements is that huge
amounts of information are generated and little of it is utilized. As has
been stated, the vast majority of wire transfers are conducted for legiti-
mate purposes. Even the Federal Reserve Board, an organization with far
superior experience and expertise in regulating large-volume wire trans-
fers by banks than the Treasury Department, 2  has expressed concern
about the high costs that would be imposed on banks and their customers
who send and receive funds transfers. Additionally, the Board expressed
its concern that the proposed regulations could seriously impede the effi-
ciency of the nation's large-dollar electronic funds transfer systems. 2 S
The Federal Reserve included with its comment letter to the Trea-
sury a staff prepared analysis of the Proposed Rulemaking setting forth
its concerns and proposals for alternatives, which states in part:
If adopted as proposed, the amendment would impose very sub-
stantial costs on banks handling funds transfers; however, Treasury
has not demonstrated that the particular elements of the proposal
that are likely to impose the greatest costs on banks will yield com-
mensurate benefits in terms of improved ability to investigate money
laundering activities or prosecute criminals. In particular, Treasury
has not demonstrated, as required by the Bank Secrecy Act under 31
U.S.C. Sec. 1952, that these recordkeeping requirements "have a high
120. Jeanne lida, IRS' Kirby Braces to Fight Drugs With Electronic Data, THE AMER-
ICAN BANKER, October 19, 1990 at 2; see also Control Efforts, supra note 6, at 149 (testi-
mony of Donald Sergeant, President, Independent Bankers Association of America).
121. See Control Efforts, supra note 6.
122. Letter from William Wiles, Secretary of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System to Peter K. Nunez, Assistant Secretary, Department of the Treasury, Janu-
ary 25, 1991 (comment letter) [hereinafter Wiles letter]; see also Treasury May have FED
for a Partner on Money Laundering Rule, Attorney Says, BNA's BANKING REPORT, Aug. 19,
1991, at 290.
123. Wiles Letter, supra note 122.
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degree of usefulness in criminal, tax or regulatory investigations and
proceedings." The Board believes that simplified and less costly re-
cordkeeping requirements could be established that would provide ad-
equaie information on funds transfers for those law enforcement pur-
poses for which the records will most likely be used. If subsequent
experience demonstrated that these records were inadequate and that
additional requirements are needed to effectively serve law enforce-
ment purposes, such requirements could be added at a later date. 2 "
The letter goes on to suggest that wire transfer recordkeeping could
be effective to: detect financial crimes, such as money laundering, or the
underlying illegal activity, such as drug trafficking; investigate such activ-
ity by linking parties in a chain of transfer of illicit proceeds; or trace the
proceeds of illegal activity for potential seizure..12 5 However, the Board
insists that there are less burdensome, less complex and less costly alter-
natives. The Board adopts three principles prior to providing its sugges-
tions. First, because timely processing is an essential characteristic of the
nations' large-volume funds transfer system, any requirement should not
result in the delay of the execution of any payment orders. Second, any
mandatory recordkeeping should not require greater manual intervention
than is present in today's highly automated payments mechanism. Fi-
nally, the rule should not require banks to obtain information not gener-
ally obtainable under current regulations unless the costs to obtain the
additional information are outweighed by the benefits to law enforcement
in detecting and investigating money laundering activity.12 Generally, the
Board suggests that only the minimum necessary information, already
collected by the originator's bank, be sent with the payment order to the
beneficiary bank for retention. Additionally, the Board recommends that
all bank-to-bank transfers and transfers of less than $10,000 (like the cur-
rency transaction reporting) be exempted from any requirements. 2 7
Imposing a monetary threshold on the recording requirement alone
could reduce much of the useless information that would be collected
under Treasury's current proposals. It has been suggested that exempting
amounts under $1000 would eliminate the need for reporting the one-time
consumer transactions or emergency transmissions of funds to stranded
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. See also European Update, supra note 70 (discussing an EC directive on the
prevention of use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering):
The principle of the Directive is that institutions are in the best position to
judge whether laundering is taking place or not and builds on agreements al-
ready incorporated in the 1988 UN Vienna Convention against drug trafficking
.... This system was chosen above the U.S. system which requires all transac-
tions above US 10,000 dollars to be automatically reported to the authorities,
and the US system was considered too expensive as it does not differentiate
between normal and suspect transactions.
For a more in depth review of current anti-money laundering activities in Europe, see Euro-
pean Initiatives, supra note 8.
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travelers. 2 '
Broader implementation of "know your customer" policies could as-
sist in the government's enforcement efforts. Although solicited for com-
ment in the Advanced Notice, Treasury failed to integrate such policy
into its Proposed Rules. Under "know your customer" policies, banks
make reasonable efforts to become familiar with its deposit and loan cus-
tomers, and makes a reasonable assessment of the types of use and rea-
sons for a customer's use of ancillary services such as wire transfers, cash-
iers checks, money orders, etc. Banks should then decline to do business
with individuals failing to provide sufficient information and businesses
which refuse to provide proper background information and creden-
tials. 2 ' A concerted effort toward meeting these basic principles allows
the institution to assist in identifying suspicious deposit and transaction
account activities. For instance, a neighborhood delicatessen typically has
no business need to open multiple accounts that receive volumes of cash
in increments of less than $10,000 dollars and which are periodically ag-
gregated and wired to a numbered account in Luxembourg. Such discrep-
ancies would be apparent to the institution, and information regarding
that particular suspicious account would then be reported to enforcement
officials. The great majority of transfers undertaken for legitimate and
valid business and personal reasons would not need to be reported.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Treasury Department should heed industry warnings, concerns
and admonitions contained in the comment letters on the Proposed
Rulemaking on wire transfer recordkeeping. With the domestic banking
industry currently experiencing economic pressure from several different
fronts, an additional layer of mandatory recordkeeping could prove more
costly than the compliance figures indicate. Although it professes a lauda-
ble objective, if this proposal is approved in the form proposed, serious
adverse consequences may result. Not only is the Treasury Department
out of sync with its fellow domestic bank regulators in the Federal Re-
serve, it is out of sync with the rest of the financial world. It is imperative
that the Treasury Department reconsider the cost and benefit of mandat-
ing such far-reaching recordkeeping requirements, especially when there
exist less intrusive avenues toward combatting the ills of money launder-
ing. This worthy battle must not detract from the efficiencies and com-
petitive advantages currently enjoyed by this nations' electronic funds
transfer international payments system. This proposal should not survive
the moratorium on the release of federal regulations imposed by Presi-
dent Bush in his State of the Union message.
Gerard Wyrsch
128. See Blanket Reporting, supra note 8, at 890.
129. See Know Your Customer, supra note 83, at 8.
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